Abstract: Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) are effective platforms for science research and 9 monitoring, and for military and commercial data-gathering purposes. However, there is an inevitable risk of 10 loss during any mission. Quantifying the risk of loss is complex, due to the combination of vehicle reliability 11 and environmental factors, and cannot be determined through analytical means alone. An alternative 12 approach -formal expert judgment -is a time-consuming process; consequently a method is needed to 13 broaden the applicability of judgments beyond the narrow confines of an elicitation for a defined 14 environment. We propose and explore a solution founded on a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN), where the 15 results of the expert judgment elicitation are taken as the initial prior probability of loss due to failure. The 16 network topology captures the causal effects of the environment separately on the vehicle and on the 17 support platform, and combines these to produce an updated probability of loss due to failure. An extended 18 version of the Kaplan Meier estimator is then used to update the mission risk profile with travelled distance.
Introduction 1
Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) have a future as effective platforms for science research and 2 monitoring, and for military and commercial data-gathering purposes. Increasingly they are being used in 3 environments that are not benign [1, 2] . Environments such as under sea ice [3] , under shelf ice [4] , or along 4 rocky coasts [5] intuitively give rise to a higher risk of loss should the vehicle malfunction. The risk of loss is 5 real; for example, Australian and British AUVs have been lost under ice sheets [6] and one team maintained a 6 lightweight tether to an AUV when operating under sea ice. The problem of predicting risk of loss is not only 7 one of predicting the reliability of the vehicle as a whole, its sub-systems and its components, but also of how 8 the operating environment, together with reliability, sets the probability of losing the vehicle. It is not obvious 9 that an approach based on separate statistical analyses of vehicle reliability and the affects of the 10 environment on probability of loss is either feasible or meaningful. Such an approach, when reduced to 11 summary statistics such as mean time to failure, would ignore the interaction between individual faults or 12 incidents and the environment, which we postulate to be at the centre of this problem.
13
One alternative would be to assess the probability of loss in various environments directly, by counting the 14 frequency of occurrence. This frequentist approach is certainly appropriate for assessing the reliability of 15 identical engineered systems, where probability of failure is derived from a long-run frequency of occurrence,
16
usually from the study of many items in use. Such an approach is the foundation for general reliability 17 handbooks [7] . This is also the approach taken for obtaining reliability statistics in the offshore industry, for 18 example the OREDA database [8] , first published in 1984 [9] . However, this methodology "does not give the 19 designer or manufacturer any insight into, or control over, the actual causes of failure since the cause-and-
20
effect relationships impacting reliability are not captured" [10] . It is precisely that cause-and-effect between 21 vehicle fault or incident and the environment that we seek to establish.
22
In [11] , the authors present a risk management process tailored to AUV deployment in extreme 23 environments. The method was used to support the decision to deploy the Autosub 3 AUV underneath an ice 24 shelf, the Pine Island Glacier, Amundsen Sea, Antarctica in 2009 and later in 2013 [12] . Expert judgment was 25 sought to quantify the likelihood of loss given a fault, and the experts' supporting text provided insights into 26 possible causes and effects. The expert judgments were aggregated using mathematical analytical methods
27
In contrast to the simple, yet high risk, case of AUV operation under an ice shelf, operations in other 28 environments pose more complex risk scenarios, examples include under sea ice and coastal operations.
29
Furthermore, the risk is often modified by the characteristics of the support platform. There is a set of AUV 30 mission circumstances, therefore, where the range of factors is sufficiently large that it would be 31 impracticable to ask an expert panel to review and assess every possibility. A method is needed to estimate 32 risk under different conditions that minimizes the call on external experts, yet is well founded on their 33 judgments.
34
In the third stage, the extended Kaplan Meier estimator is used for updating the risk profile in light of the 23 revised probability of loss given failure. 4
Autonomous Underwater Vehicle Risk Modelling and Analysis for Extreme Environment Missions

1
Our Autonomous Underwater Vehicle risk model is based on the vehicle's intrinsic failure history and expert 2 judgments on the impacts of failure in the target operating environment. As subjective probability is a belief 3 assessment on the likelihood of a hypothesis being true, this will differ between individuals when the 4 uncertainty is epistemic, that is, due to imperfect knowledge. There remains controversy among statisticians 5 over the validity of subjective probability, between the frequentists and the adherents of Bayes' theorem 6 [13] . However, O'Hagan and colleagues argue that "this controversy does not arise" for the practical 7 elicitation of subjective probability [13] . Hence, in this work a formal process of eliciting expert judgment was 
10
Several formal expert judgment elicitation methods have been developed over the years [14] . For this work,
11
we draw upon the formal expert judgment elicitation that was conducted in order to build the risk model for 
19
Reference cases for risk of loss in different environments were obtained from an earlier study in which ten 20 independent experts were asked to consider the simple question, "What is the probability of loss of the
21
Autosub3 AUV in the given environment X given the fault/incident Y?" [14] . X comprised four example to have fallen into two camps -optimists and pessimists. While noting these differences of opinion, the 33 overall aggregated outcome was formed using a linear opinion pool for each fault or incident [21] . The final 34 results were visualized as relative frequency distributions for the assigned probabilities for each environment, In reaching their judgments on the risk when operating in these four environments the experts were provided 6 with brief descriptions of the characteristics of each environment that affect risk of loss. However, each 7 expert also drew on their own knowledge of the operating environments, and in the supporting comments to 8 their judgements gave reasons for reaching their probability of loss estimate for each fault. Rather than 9 mathematically aggregating these judgements into a single probability of loss in each environment, which 10 would over-simplify the assessment, and give a false sense of confidence, Figure 1 shows the probability 11 frequency distribution for each environment from the judgements of the experts.
12
For sea ice, the experts were asked to keep in mind an area of first year ice (0.3-2.0m thick), 50% ice 13 concentration, with ice keels to 15m, sporadic icebergs and a ship capable of breaking 2m ice at 2kt. These 14 parameters form the particular reference case -the prior information for the Bayesian approach -for the 15 motivating example in this study. To help extend the risk modelling to other ice conditions, the experts' 16 judgments on risk in open water and under ice shelf are important. In the Bayesian sense they provide new 17 information as they bound the risks under the two extremes of sea ice conditions. Where there is a high
18
fraction of open water between the sea ice, the risk should tend to that of open water. That will also be the 19 case with thin films of ice, including frazil, shuga and grease ice [19] . The risk here is virtually independent of 20 ship ice-breaking capability, these forms of ice posing no difficulty to even a low-capability vessel. In contrast,
21
where multi-year ice is present, and the open water fraction is small, the risk will tend towards that of operating under an ice shelf, with the risk markedly dependent on the ice breaking capability of the support 23 ship. These effects are captured in the Bayesian Belief Network topology proposed in section 3.
25
Survival Modelling and analysis
26
The expert judgment on the criticality of failures in specific environments enables the identification of critical 27 design and operational failures. This model alone does not allow the quantification of the probability of 28 survival with travelled distance. Statistical survival modelling is a well known approach for representing 29 systems' survival with operating time or distance. This method is based on the assumption that survival data
30
can be classed as censored, that is, the system survived at least a known time or distance, or not censored,
31
this is, the system is known to have failed at a given time or distance. This binary approach to modelling 32 survival data does not suit the use of expert subjective judgment. In [11] an extended Kaplan Meier statistical 33 survival estimator survival was proposed that combined the expert judgment on the likelihood of failure 6 leading to loss and the distance at which the failure has emerged to build a survival profile for vehicle loss in a 1 given environment. This extended Kaplan-Meier estimator is: 
23
The first example, Figure 2a , is from a scenario where the AUV is tasked with long-range unattended 24 exploration of a mid-ocean ridge using sonar and sampling systems [27] . The revised probability of loss is 25 affected by two factors: recovery effectiveness and AUV Susceptibility, represented as intermediate nodes.
26
Recovery effectiveness acknowledges that the distance between the AUV and the base may be some 27 hundreds of kilometres and that the availability of a suitable ship for an unscheduled recovery may be 28 uncertain. The observable nodes being an index of ship availability, which may be an ordered set, and a 29 numeric AUV-Base separation distance. The AUV Susceptibility when on the surface and in mid-water would 30 be captured in an appropriate risk reference case, which would also capture the risk for a defined reference 31 seabed morphology. In the BBN, the risk due to the reference seabed morphology would be modified by the 32 expected seabed roughness and slope probability density functions at the particular exploration site. It may 33 well be the case that there would be insufficient information to generate the slope and roughness within the working area, especially at a sufficiently high resolution appropriate to assessing risk to the AUV. In such a 1 case, the uncertainty would be expressed through a wider slope-roughness probability distribution.
2
The second example, Figure 2b , captures key risk elements when working in coastal waters. Recovery 
10
A prototype network that captures the essence of AUV operation in sea ice is shown in Figure 3 , and is used 
24
Thickness values can be instantiated, or a frequency distribution used. 
Risk Reference Case
26
The risk reference case for a nominal probability of loss, P(loss) is that determined by the group of experts 
11
ice shelf, were points of singularity in the BBN model. These conditions are presented below.
12
Let  be the random variable that represents the environment constraints on the AUV, the following 13 assumptions were implemented in the CPT: 
17
The reference case corresponds to a first-year sea ice scenario (0.3-2.0m thick), with ice keels to 15m, and
18
sporadic icebergs, at a concentration of 50% [14, 15] . To capture the reference case, the following condition 19 was set on this node.
Environment constraints on the Vessel
22
The reference support vessel was deemed able to break ice up to 2m thick. Let  be the random variable that 23 represents the environment constraints on the vessel, the following assumptions were implemented in the 24 CPT: 
31
should be identical to the probability of loss distribution elicited for the reference sea ice case. This is:
Where  stands for AUV Susceptibility, damage to the AUV hull affecting its buoyancy or water-tight integrity, which will be minimal at ice 7 thicknesses of 0.1m and less, but becomes substantial at 0.5m and above, with ice concentration again 8 affecting the probability of occurrence, (c) if the AUV surfaces under ice, its ability to receive a navigation fix 9 would be compromised, and the acoustic propagation conditions could be poor, leading to difficulties in 10 locating the vehicle, affected by both thickness and concentration.
11
Other key assumptions were: 
24
Vessel effectiveness was reduced sharply as the ice thickness became comparable with the standard for each 25 class, weighted by the sea ice concentration. 
Revised Probability of Loss
29
To define the CPT for this node, the main question addressed was: What is the effect of the vessel 30 effectiveness on the AUV Susceptibility? Given the probability judgments on AUV Susceptibility are in a 31 particular range; will the vessel effectiveness move the probability judgments lower or higher? An important 32 assumption was that, if the vessel effectiveness was deemed as 3 kts the output P(loss) distribution should be 12 fraction of the probability judgments were moved to a range of greater risk. Conversely, when vessel 1 effectiveness was deemed higher than 3 kts a fraction of the probability judgments moved towards a range of 2 lower risk.
4
The Beta distribution offers an alternative and more suitable approach for modeling expert judgments [13] .
11
The mean ( j  ) and variance ( 2 j  ) for the Beta distribution can be obtained using the formulation presented in
12
(6) and (7).
16
Equations (6) and (7) are central to the risk updating method proposed in this paper. Given that the risk judgment for a particular failure is known, the hyper-parameters of the Beta distribution (α and β) can be 18 estimated using (6) and (7). The expressions for obtaining alpha and beta parameters are presented in (8) and (9) .
A discrete distribution over the sixteen probability judgment classes can then be created using the Beta 23 distribution. These are steps 1 and 2 of the risk updating process; automatically executed using Matlab. Then, a series of sequential steps must be performed in order to complete the risk updating process. In brief:
1.
Encode probability judgment in a Beta distribution. For each fault, a pooled expert probability 26 judgment and its variance are used to calculate the hyper-parameters of the Beta distribution, using (8) and 27 (9).
28
2. Discretization of the Beta distribution. A discretization algorithm is used to create a probability 29 distribution over all sixteen classes of the 'Nominal PLoss' Node.
4.
Fit a Beta distribution to the 'Revised P(loss)'. The maximum likelihood algorithm is used to fit a Beta 1 probability function to the 'Revised P(loss)' distribution.
2
5.
Mean and variances for the 'Revised P(loss)' are calculated using equations (1) and (2).
Once steps 1 to 5 have been carried out for all failures. The probability of survival with distance is 4 calculated using the extended Kaplan Meier method.
5
5.
Using the network to reason with risk
6
The inference algorithms embedded within most commercially available BBN tools can support four types of 7 reasoning: predictions, diagnostics, combined and intercausal [16] . Here, we are interested in using the BBN 8 for computing predictions as to how factors described in the previous section influence and revise the 9 probability of loss given a fault. The software tool's inference algorithm propagates the observable evidence 10 through the network updating the belief in the states of its child nodes; a relative frequency distribution is 11 calculated for each of the latter nodes, conditioned on all of the hard and soft evidence.
12
This section provides two examples that demonstrate the use of the BBN model topology presented in Figure   13 3 to estimate risks in under sea ice AUV missions. 
20
Hourly ice observations were made by members of the science party trained in using the ASPeCt code.
21
Overall ice concentration varied from 0-60%. At the start of the vehicle's mission the primary ice type was 22 fast ice 1.5m thick, with the secondary type being first-year ice floes also 1.5m thick at the edge of the fast ice 26 Figure 4 shows the BBN topology with node state tables corresponding to a set of states after the reasoning 27 embedded within the CPTs. In this example, the output probability distribution is skewed towards lower 28 probability of loss compared with the reference case. While the vessel is of lower capability (LU5) than the 29 reference (LU7), and 60% of the ice present was 1m or greater in thickness, at the upper end or exceeding the 30 vessel's breaking ability, for the mission as a whole, ice concentration was low with 87% at a concentration of 31 30% or below.
32
The probability of loss given fault is considered to be that assessed for failure 387_1 of Autosub2. In this 33 failure, Autosub2 failed to home in to the acoustic command sent by the ship, the vehicle headed off in an 14 Figure 5 shows the BBN topology with node state tables corresponding to a set of states given in each 15 observable node after the reasoning embedded within the CPTs.
16
The support vessel is more capable in this second example (LU7 rather than LU5) and equal to the reference 17 case. However, the ice concentration is higher at 100%. The ice thickness distribution had a strong peak at 2m
18 with a small contribution from multiyear ice over 2m thick. In combination, the Ice Concentration and the Ice
19
Thickness lead to more severe Environmental Constraints on the AUV compared with the Greenland case,
20
with 68% rated 'high' compared with 0%. Vessel effectiveness was predominantly below 0.5kts in these 21
conditions. In the resulting revised assessment of P(loss) the mode, at ~34%, was in the risk class of ]0.01, 
8
This section presents a summary of the sensitivity analysis conducted for the model presented in section 3.
9
We use three axioms to guide the sensitivity analysis. 
5kts. In mathematical notation: T(xi) > T(xv) => V(xi) = 0.5kts.
16
This axiom can be verified by setting the ice concentration to 10/10 and varying the ice thickness from 0m to 17
5m.
18 Figure 6 shows the results of the sensitivity studies conducted on the node vessel effectiveness. We For open water conditions, results show that both vessels can travel at full speed of 10kts. For an ice thickness 24 of 0.1m both vessels can make similar progress, the same for 0.5m ice thickness.
25
A vessel travels at a speed of 3kts when it is breaking ice thickness that meets its capability. Results show that 26 while for the LU7 vessel the mode of the distribution is at ice thickness of 1m for the LU9 type vessel the 27 mode of the distribution is at 2m. The ramming speed is different for both vessels. The output shows that an
28
LU7 vessel starts ramming ice at an ice thickness of 2m while an LU9 vessel is likely to start ramming at an ice 29 thickness of 5m. An LU7 class vessel runs to a stop when the ice thickness reaches 5m. set to 100% Figure 7 shows the results of running the BBN model for all combinations of ice thickness. The contour plots
concentration I(xi) > I(xj) and T(xi) = T(xj), then P(xi) > P(xj
6
were generated using the contour function of Matlab R2011b. Figure 7a shows the distribution of the AUV
7
Susceptibility node when the nominal Probability of loss is instantiated to ] 0.03, 0.1] and ice concentration is 8 50%. Figure 7b shows the distribution of the AUV Susceptibility node when the nominal Probability of loss is 9
instantiated to ]0.03, 0.1] and ice concentration is 100%. Figure 7c shows the AUV Susceptibility distribution 10 when the nominal Probability of loss is instantiated to ]0.1, 0.2] and ice concentration is instantiated to 50%.
11
Figure 7d presents the distribution of AUV Susceptibility for the same nominal Probability of loss but ice 12 concentration of 100%.
13
The results show that for ice concentration of 50%, for ice thickness between 0.5m-2m, nominal sea ice 
concentration I(xi) > I(xj) and thickness T(xi) = T(xj), then P(xi) > P(xj).
21
To verify this axiom, the BBN model was instantiated with a range for the nominal probability of loss and an
22
ice thickness value. The ice concentration was then increased from 0% to 100%. We present the result of and 'Ice thickness' were set with the states depicted in Figure 5 .
7 
11
The updated risk model allows us to quantify the criticality of each fault when the AUV is deployed in a new 12 operating environment. This information is important since it allows decision makers to address the question
13
of whether or not it is cost effective to completely remove a fault.
14 Quantitatively, from Figure 9 , the probability of survival drops quickly in the first 32km. 
10
A more detailed analysis would involve assessing each failure separately and quantifying the effect of the 11 vessel effectiveness, ice concentration and ice thickness on each particular failure. Such a study would help us
12
to build a more precise probability distribution. However, for the purpose of this paper, the aim is to expose
13
BBNs as a means to capture arguments of this nature as well other arguments relevant to the AUV risk 14 prediction in Polar missions.
15
The approach can be extended to other factors affecting AUVs under sea ice by adding to the observable 
20
It is possible, that for some operating areas there is a combination of variation of two or more environments,
21
for example, a combination of coastal, Pc, and sea ice environments, Pi. In this case the combined probability of loss can be calculated using the following expression: Pt = 1 -(1-Pc)*(1-Pi).
23
Fundamental to this work is the source data on reliability and faults and incidents with the vehicle. Accurate
24
and complete recording of this information is essential to assess and control risk on AUV missions.
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Acknowledgement
27
We thank the ten AUV experts from outside the UK that gave freely of their time in assessing the fault history 
